Tukhachevskii
3. Context: He led major operations during the Civil War of 1918-1921 and had great success during the Revolution. He built the Red Army and focused on the concept of the deep battle and using the environment of liberal thinking in the Soviet military at the time to gain acceptance of his ideas. He was executed by Stalin in 1937 because of his close association and sympathies with some of the Western ideas, his concepts likely were fundamental to the Soviet victory during WWII. 4. Scope: 5. Evidence/credibility: 6. Central Proposition/Thesis: Create and advocate a military concept that was able to fill the large gap between strategy and tactics. His concept originated operational art and the concept of deep battle which combined simultaneous operations across a large front with mobility and fire power to penetrate deep into an enemy's lines and annihilate the enemy. It is exceptionally offensively minded. 7. Sub-themes: a. Tukhachevskii is categorical-and in terms not just of planning but of commodities on the ground-about the need for advanced logistic preparation not just for the opening battle but for the entire operation, series of operations, or campaign. (20) a. , All levels of Tukhachevskii's thinking arc permeated by this theme of adequacy of resources; and the very technological awareness which singled him out from his contemporaries in the Soviet Union-and his counterparts m most of the West-may well have derived from Engels rather than from a detached view of the contemporary scene. (21) b. Understood the trinity from a ways and means perspective. Part of a balanced trinity is determining what level of the means can be supported by the available ways –manpower for the army, agricultural capacity for supplies, manufacturing capability to keep ammunition flowing, etc. The political leadership must take these capabilities and limitations into account before determining a desired ends. (103) c. Did not like the idea of occupation of territory due to the burden on defending it. Drains resources and inherent mobility (21), (116) d. Technologically advanced forces come with large logistical overhead. The manpower saved from employing technology is offset by the manpower required to maintain it. e. Once a penetration of the enemy line is achieved, the rest of the line goes on the defensive to ensure the enemy doesn’t punch a hole back into your deep areas. f. Operational art and increased mobility allows for the shock troops to penetrate the line wherever the break through took place, as opposed to waiting for the hole to appear where the shock troops are pre-staged. (37) g. Deep operations divide defending forces, and intend to envelope them as exploitation troops turn and surround the front line forces. (39) h. Deep operations requires integration of all combined arms. (40) i. Defense can be employed similarly by absorbing the attack, providing a stubborn retreat, and once the enemy is committed, use mobile reserve forces to cut them off and surround them. (48) j. The destruction of the enemy army is not the end, it’s the means. (86) k. Deep operations seize and hold the initiative. (90) l. Emphasizes importance of operational level C2, to include centralized command and synchronization (97) and decentralized execution to maintain the initiative (150) m. Deep operations require complete integration of all available air assets. This is the origin of the Soviet Air Force’s limited design (in Overy terms) (156) n. Soviet doctrine is to reinforce strength to further exploit a breakthrough. Reserve forces won’t go to a point in the line that is weakened by enemy activity, they’ll go to the penetration and exploit an enemy’s backfield. This is in contrast to Western doctrine that reinforces weakness to maintain the defense and pursue a strategy of attrition. (195). (Western doctrine has since swung to maneuver warfare) o. Soviet doctrine rooted in the encounter battle where the engagement is underway as soon as forces make contact with the enemy. Therefore, Soviets are prepared to attack from the maneuver column and are always seeking the initiative in the offense. (214) p. 10. Importance. (What is the significance of this work in the development of the theory and practice of military art and science? What influence did it have on the conduct of war? What is its contemporary and future relevance?): 11. Personal significance. How has this work contributed to the development of my '''personal '''theory of war?